Advanced Draft Preparation: An In-Depth Study on Quarterback Drafting

TheFFGhost

“Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.”
– Sun Tzu(The Art of War)

artofwarAs part of our on-going series about advanced draft preparation, we will delve deeper into the drafting habits observed in Dynasty League Football’s mock draft series hosted by DLF’s own, Ryan McDowell’s (@RyanMC23). This article will focus solely on the quarterback position and what trends or behaviors a start-up draft owner may be able to exploit. For background on the methodology and research conducted to obtain these results please check the first article in this search entitled “Advanced Draft Preparation – Annihilating Herd Mentality.”

Please note each positional article should be viewed as a self-contained work that relates only to the original piece. Each should not be viewed as being compatible with other positional pieces. The strategies laid out in each positional piece are specific only to the position being examined and a strategy in one positional piece may run counter to a separate strategy in a different position. Each subsequent article will seek only to maximize the value of the subject position.

In the format and scoring system used to conduct the draft’s in question, the quarterback position is far and away the highest scoring position. This scoring format is fairly standard as most leagues tend to place a premium, in regards to points, on solid quarterback production. So what have these leagues taught us about the position?

First, out of 216 first round selections (18 leagues observed times 12 first round picks per league), quarterbacks only went with ten of those picks, or put another way, quarterbacks only accounted for 5% of all first round picks. At first glance, this is an extremely odd occurrence. The top nine scorers in the league are all quarterbacks, but in a full 50% of the leagues observed a quarterback was not selected in the first round. In all of those drafts where a quarterback was taken in the first round the second highest scoring quarterback (Aaron Rodgers) was always selected and only once was a quarterback selected twice in the first round with the third highest scoring quarterback (Tom Brady) being selected.

However, in 17 out of 18 leagues (94%) both the highest scoring running back (Adrian Peterson, tenth overall scorer) and the highest scoring wide receiver (Calvin Johnson, 11th overall scorer) were both selected in the first round with only once instance of the top running back falling to the second round at pick 2.02.

One would assume in a league where the top ten scoring leaders is dominated by a single position, the position in question would go flying off the board quickly however assumed logic fails here, why?

As it turns out while quarterback production is by far the highest of any position, the point differential from one quarterback to the next isn’t overly steep. The point difference from the top scoring quarterback (419.25) and the 12th highest scoring quarterback (311.75) is only 107.5 points. Meanwhile, the point differential between the top scoring running back (351.40 points) and the 12th highest scoring running back (219.50 points) is 131.90 points. The scarcity in the running back position as well as the rapid erosion player over player cause this immediate run right out of the gate.

So when, and why, does the quarterback rush tend to occur? According to the findings, two-thirds of all quarterbacks drafted come off the board between rounds three and six with a significant value spike in round six. Round six yields an average quarterback selection that scores between the number six and number seven highest scoring quarterback. Meanwhile, a running back selected in the same sixth round yields a player that is ranked between the 30th highest scoring running back and the 31st highest scoring running back.

The downside to waiting until later for a quarterback is the risk that you end up drafting a quarterback ranked seventh or lower. The reason for this is simple, in a 12 team league if you are drafting a quarterback that is seventh or lower you now run the very real risk of being outscored at that position on any given week. Simply put, if you aren’t scoring in the top six, you’re scoring in the bottom six. If you draft the seventh ranked quarterback you are at a 58% chance of being outscored (7/12), if you draft the eighth ranked quarterback you are at a 66% chance of being outscored (8/12), if you draft the ninth ranked quarterback you are at a 75% chance of being outscored (9/12), if you draft the tenth ranked quarterback you are at a 83% chance of being outscored (10/12), if you draft the eleventh ranked quarterback you are at a 92% chance of being outscored (11/12) and if you draft the twelfth ranked quarterback you are at a 100% chance of being outscored (12/12). These numbers are not solid, set-in-stone probabilities, rather that are approximations. Furthermore, obviously, if at all possible you want to be outscoring your opponents at as many positions as possible. The more positions you outscore an opponent at the greater chance you have of winning on any given “fake” Sunday (or Monday for those nail-biting games). In the observed leagues 18 different quarterbacks were selected. If we order just the drafted quarterbacks they fall into the graph you see below:

qbscores

The way to read this is that since the observed leagues were 12 team leagues the top six scoring quarterbacks have the best chance to repeat their performance, those are the quarterbacks encompassed by the green area. The quarterbacks in the yellow area are those who scored the seventh through twelfth highest amount of points, these quarterbacks give you a lower than 50% chance of beating your opponent on any given week. Those quarterbacks in red are outside of the top 12 and should not be your starting quarterback as the chances of these quarterbacks outscoring any of the top 12 quarterbacks is extremely unlikely.

Now, like every year these quarterbacks fluctuate. The chances of Kaepernick staying outside of the top 12 is highly unlikely, the reason he is there this year is because he took over his team after several games had already been played and this places him at a disadvantage. That being said, it would surprise me immensely if he moved into the top six, or even the top half of the bottom six so weigh him as you see fit. In the end his placement doesn’t change the concept of this graph which is that while waiting to draft a quarterback may bring some additional value, that value is tied directly to the timing of the pick and to how much your opponents individually, and collectively, value quarterbacks. If an owner waits too long to draft a quarterback they could see themselves on the outside of the top six looking in.

qbgraph2

The chart above brings me to a strategy I have employed in the past and have promoted to those willing, and brave, enough. The idea here is to draft two top quarterbacks due to the scarcity of the position and due to the high point output of they produce. The idea is that if one owner can somehow collect two top six quarterbacks he does two things, first, he lowers the amount of owners who have access to a top six quarterback by one. This sounds trivial at face value but by doing this he now changes the possibility that one of his quarterbacks outscores any given opponent’s quarterback to 58% (7/12) as opposed to the 50/50 chance he had before. Second, the value of the quarterback sitting on his bench is very solid. For instance, even if the owner was able to secure the fifth and sixth highest scoring quarterbacks, the sixth highest scorer (Matt Ryan) accumulated 370.35 points. The 13th highest scoring quarterback (Joe Flacco), which some unlucky team would be forced to start week in and week out accumulated only 292.95 points. This roughly 78 point difference is incredibly significant as over a 16 game season that breaks down to an almost five point deficit per game. Now, that is if we are talking about a 16 game season though, if it lowers to 13 games the shift is 6 points and if it is a 12 game season it gets as high as 6.5 points per game! No team wants to leave anywhere between 5 and 6.5 points per game just sitting on the table when they could just make a trade and instantly see their points, and chances of winning, increase.

Granted, this strategy is unorthodox and risky. Going this route leaves the possibility that you could miss out on a key piece of your team and so this trick should be performed only by those supremely confident in their drafting abilities. However, this technique, dubbed “The Ghost Maneuver” by some owners I play in multiple leagues with, does work. I can attest to its effectiveness. In only one league that I employed this in did I not make the playoffs in the first year and of those playoff teams I made it to the finals in nearly every league. In the very worst case you can play match-ups with two elite quarterbacks and if one goes down to injury your top scoring position is still safe. Best case you are holding a value marker for future trades while removing one of the highest scoring players from the league talent pool.

How can this move be justifiable?

Returning to the data, it becomes very important to determine where the floor is on drafting a top six quarterback. What is the longest we can wait to maximize the value of this position? As it turns out if your team is in a win now mode you may be able to wait some time. In one of the drafts Peyton Manning, the fifth highest scoring quarterback last season went with pick 10.08. If you are looking for a younger quarterback in the top six to last your team a bit longer Matt Ryan, the sixth highest scoring quarterback went as late as the 6.04 pick. The top four quarterbacks, Brees, Rodgers, Newton and Brady all went significantly higher with more frequency. Peyton Manning on the other hand went, on average, with the 7.03 pick, and was never selected earlier than the sixth round in any of the 18 drafts. Matt Ryan was drafted, on average, with the 5.05 pick and went as high as the third but never escaped the sixth round in any of the 18 drafts.

So what is occurring at the other positions in those rounds? Starting with the running backs in round six we see the value of the position dip below the positional draft average in this round after which it declines and never moves above that average for the rest of draft. What this tells us is that the value of the position by round six is essentially tapped out so the running taken from round six on are unlikely to significantly help your team.

Moving on the wide receiver position we see that by round six this position is already well into its decline. The wide receiver position starts its move below the positional draft average in round five and falls sharply in round eight.

Finally, the tight end position is the only position outside of quarterback which actually sees a value spike in round six. This spike moves the position above the positional average for round six only after a decline that starts in round five. After round six the decline continues throughout the rest of the draft.

Given this information when is the best time and situation in which to employ the “Ghost Maneuver?” With the desire to stay as competitive as long as possible in dynasty leagues the value on a second quarterback would trend towards drafting the youngest quarterback possible within the top six with your second quarterback selection. As such this means Matt Ryan should be targets with this technique. So knowing Ryan, on average, is selected with the 5.05 pick but the value for this technique doesn’t kick in until the sixth round, this leaves only a subset of all drafts where this is viable, namely those drafts where Ryan slips into the sixth round. In those drafts this technique should only be employed if you have two running backs, one quarterback, one wide receiver and one tight end. The reason for this is by selecting a second quarterback in the sixth round you are foregoing the value spike in tight end. You also can not justify this technique from a value standpoint at both running back and wide receiver due to their dips in value below their positional average in the sixth round.

In this scenario ,if a second quarterback is taken in the sixth round then it is highly advisable to select a wide receiver in the seventh round before the large drop in value in the eighth round. If this technique is followed as outlined, the roster your team should have at the end of round seven is two quarterbacks, two running backs, two wide receivers and one tight end. As you can see this is a very solid foundation for any team and it holds incredible value!

It is difficult to understate just how important a top-notch quarterback is to obtain in a startup. While running backs are the most sought after position, they are supernovas in dynasty terms, they burn bright for a while and then burn out. Quarterbacks are much more consistent and will be your major point producer well after your running back has been replaced by “the next big thing.” As such great importance must be placed upon the position. The quarterback also tends to be a nature choke point in many leagues as you only start one, as such collecting as many of the high end players at that position as possible will significantly impact your opponents ability to compete with you at the highest point scoring position. Even if one or more high end quarterbacks are sitting on your bench, that is just one more elite player not putting points up for opponents.

As the quote at the beginning of this article says, at what your opponents don’t know what to defend, It is truly the key to immediate as well as long term success in fantasy football.